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Abstract
Given the serious social problems confronting Americans and others worldwide, the 
authors propose that Dewey’s 1932 challenge to teachers is worthy of reconsideration 
by educators at all levels. In times similar to our own, Dewey challenged teachers 
to cultivate students’ capacities to identify their happiness with what they can do 
to improve the conditions of others. At fi rst glance, his challenge seems utopian. 
In order to justify their proposal for reconsideration, the authors explicate Dewey’s 
challenge by discussing two aspects of the thinking that lies behind it. Th ese are 
1) Dewey’s concept of ethical love and his argument that it is a means to social re-
form and 2) Dewey’s concept of happiness and his argument that ethical love is the 
means to happiness. Th e authors conclude that in an educational climate focused 
principally on helping students earn a living, we need to be, like Dewey, equally 
concerned with helping students have a life worth living.
In 1932, as America struggled to overcome the great economic depression and 
Hitler was taking power in Germany, Dewey issued a challenge to teachers.  Based 
upon what he viewed as the principle by which to judge “the processes of education, 
formal and informal,” he urged teachers to embrace the following goal: “Education 
should create an interest in all persons in furthering the general good, so that they 
will fi nd their own happiness realized in what they can do to improve the condi-
tions of others” (LW 7: 243). 
In setting this challenge to teachers, Dewey has in mind helping students 
develop their character in two ways.  First, teachers should nurture students’ sen-
sitivity to the impact of their speech and actions upon others.  Second, they should 
cultivate students’ capacity to take the perspective of the “ideal spectator,” that is, 
to treat the interests of others impartially, with the same weight as their own (LW 
7: 246).  Th e fi rst sort of character development is primarily aff ective. Th e second 
E&C   Education and Culture
4    Stephen M. Fishman and Lucille McCarthy
focuses on detached refl ection and is primarily cognitive. Although some research-
ers have taken up Dewey’s emphasis on developing students’ sensitivity to others by 
exploring what they call “social and emotional learning” (Elias, Parker, and Kash, 
2008), much character education remains principally cognitive.  Th is is true of 
moral theory and applied ethics courses taught at the college level that emphasize 
critical thinking skills as well as middle and high school courses that focus on dis-
cussion of moral dilemmas that arise in assigned novels and plays (see Pascarella 
and Terenzai, 2005; Simon, 2001).  
In response to exclusive emphasis on the cognitive dimension of character 
development, we believe Dewey would argue that this approach is less satisfactory 
than a more integrated one.  He might claim that because students can intelligently 
defend their moral point of view or carefully analyze a moral dilemma, it does not 
follow that that they will persistently act on their more refl ective judgments or pur-
sue the actualization of their ideals when they encounter serious obstacles in their 
path. As Dewey noted, “no matter how elaborate and how rational is the object of 
thought, it is impotent unless it arouses desire” (LW 7: 187).  
In sum, meeting Dewey’s challenge requires that teachers promote integration 
of feeling and thought or “integrity of character” (LW 7: 257).  He urges teachers to 
nurture and blend these two aspects of personality that are oft en seen as disparate 
or antithetical to one another.1  Th is is obviously a daunting task. A sign perhaps, of 
the diffi  culty of, or lack of energy for, rethinking and evaluating current character 
education is the fact that at the 2009 American Educational Research Association 
Convention less than one half of one percent of the 2,000 presentations were devoted 
to it.2  Th at is, moral and character education appear to occupy very little space on 
the present educational research agenda. Nevertheless, given the enormity of the 
economic and political troubles that Americans face today, we believe that Dewey’s 
challenge to nurture students’ potential to “fi nd their happiness realized in what 
they can do to improve the conditions of others” is worthy of serious reconsidera-
tion by teachers at all levels.3
In 1932, Dewey did not give specifi cs about how teachers should meet this 
challenge.  In view of the structure of his Lab School at the University of Chicago, 
it is likely that his strategy would focus on giving every student a share of commu-
nal work in order to strengthen his or her “social sense” (MW 1: 333).  However, 
despite the obvious importance of strategies for implementing and accessing char-
acter education, the focus of our essay is not on particular methods or programs 
(for recent discussions of such programs, see Corrigan, Grove, Vincent, Chapman, 
and Walk, 2007; Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen, 1998; Nuccie and Narvaez, 2008; 
Noddings, 2002; Skillen, 1997).  Instead, our focus is on Dewey’s challenge to teach-
ers and its implication that time devoted to researching character and moral edu-
cation should be equivalent to that currently devoted to researching how to raise 
students’ skill levels in areas like science, mathematics, and technology.  To further 
explicate Dewey’s challenge as well as defend our view that his challenge deserves 
reconsideration, we focus on two features of the thinking undergirding it.  Th ese are 
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1) Dewey’s concept of ethical love and his argument that it is an important means 
to furthering social reform and 2) his concept of happiness and his argument that 
ethical love is the means to the highest happiness.  Before turning to these two as-
pects of Dewey’s thought, we highlight some parallels between Dewey’s world of 
the 1930s and our present situation. 
Dewey’s Challenging Times and Ours 
Th e day aft er the 2008 presidential election, an article in the New York Times re-
ported that, based on exit-poll interviews, “nearly nine of every 10 Americans think 
the country is on the wrong track,” a fi gure that represents “the deepest expression 
of national pessimism in polling history.”  Th e article concludes that President-elect 
Obama would take the helm of a country that is “weary of the past and wary of 
the future, gloomy about its place in the world, cynical about its government and 
desperate for some sense of deliverance” (Baker, 2008).   Th e domestic climate de-
scribed in the New York Times strongly parallels observations John Dewey made 
approximately 75 years earlier.  In A Common Faith, published in 1934, Dewey 
wrote, “It is not diffi  cult to make a severe indictment of existing social relations.  It 
is enough to point to the war, jealousy, and fear that dominate the relations of one 
state to another; to the growing demoralization of the older ties of domestic life; 
to the staggering evidence of corruption and futility in politics, and to the egoism, 
brutality, and oppression that characterize economic activities” (LW 9: 49).4  
In an eff ort to bring about social reform, Dewey calls upon educators to culti-
vate students’ capacities to identify their happiness with what they can do to improve 
the conditions of others.  What thinking forms the background of his challenge?
Ethical Love As The Means to Social Reform 
Underlying Dewey’s challenge to teachers—and our fi rst justifi cation for our claim 
that it is worthy of reconsideration—is Dewey’s view of ethical love and its poten-
tial for social reform.  We speak of “social reform” in the broad sense in which 
Dewey employed the phrase (LW 1: 307-308).  For Dewey, social reform includes 
any changes in political, educational, economic, and family practices (and institu-
tions) that lead to enriched experience for as many people as possible.  Put otherwise, 
Dewey believes that the egoism, brutality, fear, and brutishness that mark many of 
our industrial society’s dealings and relations can be reduced through character 
education. His strategy rests upon an emotional aspect of character education that, 
as we have already noted, is oft en slighted by educators. Dewey’s primary means 
of reducing what, in the 1930s, he saw as a sense of hopelessness in the face of “im-
mense forces” whose “workings and consequences” we have no power to aff ect is 
what he calls “ethical” love (LW 13: 176; LW 7: 259; EW 2: 250).  
Dewey’s juxtaposition of “ethical” and “love” is unusual.  We normally asso-
ciate love with romance, sexual attraction, fi lial aff ection, and friendship.  By con-
trast, we associate the ethical with self-constraint, the rights of others, principles 
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of conduct, and public approbation.  Dewey recognizes these features of morality, 
but he adds another dimension to his conception of ethical behavior.  Since he be-
lieves that all thinking rests upon feelings and emotions (Williams, 1982, p. 127), 
he maintains that ethics and love, reason and emotion, are not natural enemies but 
are mutually enhanced when working in a dynamic harmony (LW 10: 166). It fol-
lows that if people are going to both intelligently and persistently work to “improve 
the conditions of others,” and if they are going to display “strength of will” (LW 7: 
190), they will need to fall in love with this objective.  If they do fall in love with 
this ideal, they will organize their lives around it. Th ey will continually be think-
ing about this objective in the way a lover continually thinks about his or her loved 
one. Th ey will be devoted to this objective, make sacrifi ces in its service, and fully 
identify with it. Th is explains why Dewey argues that if we—and uppermost in his 
mind are educators—can cultivate the human capacity for ethical love, we stand 
our best chance of furthering the general good.  He writes, 
For in its ethical sense, love signifi es completeness of devotion to the ob-
jects esteemed good. . . . It involves courage because an active and genu-
ine interest nerves us to meet and overcome the obstacles which stand in 
the way of its realization. It includes wisdom or thoughtfulness because 
sympathy, concern for the welfare of all aff ected by conduct, is the surest 
guarantee for the exercise of consideration, for examination of a proposed 
line of conduct in all its bearings. (LW 7: 259)
Dewey’s call for “completeness of devotion to the objects esteemed good” 
may raise the specter of the 1930s and the German people’s devotion to Nazism. 
We certainly acknowledge that history off ers many examples of people who have 
fully committed themselves to ideals or goals that have had horrifi c consequences 
for others. Dewey himself recognizes this when he points out that potentially posi-
tive human capacities can be used for deplorable ends. Referring to Hitler’s German 
Fascist state, Dewey observed that, for large numbers of people, Nazism took the 
form of “idealistic faith . . . of being engaged in creating a pattern for new institu-
tions which the whole world will adopt in time” (LW 13: 88).  In other words, Na-
zism appealed to some aspects of personality that Dewey views as the “better ele-
ments in human nature” (LW 13: 88), namely, our desire to cooperate, be creative, 
and serve some greater cause.   
However, Dewey’s notion of ethical is not comprised solely of wholehearted 
devotion to a cause. It also includes “thoughtfulness” and “sympathy,” and these 
are important for Dewey because they guarantee concern for “the welfare of all af-
fected by conduct” (LW 7: 259). In other words, love in its ethical sense has equally 
signifi cant emotional and cognitive elements, both of which are involved in a harmo-
nious and fruitful give and take. Ethical love brings purposeful, devoted “strength 
of will” into dialogue, that is, into a “cooperative interaction of . . . opposed ener-
gies,” with impartial reckoning of one’s actions upon others—“whether friends or 
strangers, fellow citizens or foreigners” (LW 10: 166; LW 7: 257).  Th us, those who 
Dewey's Challenge to Teachers     7
Volume 26 (2)  2010
are wholeheartedly devoted to totalitarian, authoritarian states or inhumane, in-
tolerant practices do not exemplify what Dewey views as ethical love since they do 
not display interest in making what he describes as an impartial account of one’s 
actions upon others.  
In addition, those who promote inhumane, intolerant practices are hardly 
intent on actualizing the sort of “objects esteemed good” that Dewey has in mind. 
What does Dewey mean by “objects esteemed good”?  Most generally, Dewey means 
objects that promote social reform, that is, objects that promote the conditions that 
lead to richer, fuller, and more meaningful experiences for oneself as well as make 
such experiences more and more widely available to others. For Dewey, these goods 
are divisible into two main categories.  
Esteemed Objects that Promote Communication 
Th e fi rst category includes objects that lead to better communication.  Dewey has 
in mind more than the ability to share news and information.  He is principally 
concerned with the consequences of our communications. He urges fostering com-
munication that promotes social reform by increasing our ability to see the impact of 
our actions upon others. Th is goal of increased sensitivity to others explains Dewey’s 
praise for ethical love’s “thoughtfulness” and “sympathy.” Th ese qualities increase 
our “concern for the welfare of all aff ected by conduct” and promote consideration 
of our proposed lines of conduct in all their bearings. Th e esteemed objects in this 
fi rst category help break down the barriers of class, race, and national territories. 
In sum, this sort of communication is an expression of what Dewey calls ethical 
love because it promotes the kinds of interactions that he places at the center of 
democratic living (MW 9: 93). 
Esteemed Objects that Promote Things We Most Prize 
Th e second category of objects esteemed good, for Dewey, are practices that further 
“the things in civilization we most prize” (LW 9: 57).  Among the goods Dewey 
believes we most prize are those that increase understanding of political, public, 
and private institutions, especially of the workings of commerce, education, and 
nature.  Dewey also includes whatever improves and adds to the practices of the 
arts (literary, painterly, musical), the sciences, family life, and friendship (LW 9: 35). 
A study of Dewey’s life off ers concrete examples of objects that he esteemed 
good, ones that he tried to perfect, that he loved, and to which he fully devoted 
himself. Over a 40-year period of teaching, he researched, experimented, and wrote 
about ways to improve education.  He spent the decade of the 1920s leading a move-
ment to outlaw war.  He tried to establish a third political party in the United States 
and was a founding member of the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
and the New School for Social Research. Th ese eff orts refl ect his own devotion to 
improved social institutions and human practices with the end-in-view of enriched 
experience for the greatest number of people.
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Ethical Love as the Means to the Highest Happiness 
Also underlying Dewey’s challenge, and our second justifi cation in support of our 
claim that it is worthy of reconsideration, is his conception of happiness and its 
relation to ethical love.  According to Dewey, in addition to increased changes for 
social reform, the advantage of fostering ethical love among students is that it in-
creases students’ chances for the highest happiness.
Dewey’s Conception of the Highest Happiness 
At fi rst glance, it seems that asking teachers to develop their students’ capacities for 
ethical love is utopian since it is totally out of step with the dominant view of happi-
ness in our culture.  Our students, like most Americans, typically identify happiness 
with wealth, popularity, and pleasures of various sorts. Although Dewey appreci-
ates the importance of pleasures, he does not identify pleasure with happiness (LW 
10: 23). Th e reason is that pleasures come and go and are dependent upon many 
circumstances that we cannot control. Aft er all, as he observes, life is “unstable, 
uncannily unstable” (LW 1: 43).  By contrast, Dewey argues that the most fulfi ll-
ing happiness is “not at the mercy of circumstances” (LW 7: 302).  It results from 
a steadfast commitment to one’s intelligently and wholeheartedly chosen ideals.
Th us, Dewey sees happiness not as something we gain from experiences, 
things like fame, amusement, or physical gratifi cation. Rather, it is an attitude we 
bring to experience. It is a product of personal character and disposition. Whereas 
we cannot control the outcome of our actions or the pleasures we receive from vari-
ous sorts of experiences, Dewey believes that we can control our disposition. Th is is 
why Dewey challenges teachers to focus on cultivating students’ social sympathies 
and capacity for collaborative work with others. Although our culture, through 
countless advertisements and enticements, cultivates the identifi cation of happiness 
with what we can, individually, take from life, Dewey counsels teachers to culti-
vate in their students the disposition to identify happiness with what they can do 
to improve the conditions of others. More specifi cally, the dispositions or traits of 
personality that Dewey claims we need to cultivate if we are to be happy are stabil-
ity of character and “braveness and equanimity of soul” (LW 7: 198).5 
We grant that each of these traits seems diffi  cult to develop. It can be diffi  -
cult to achieve stability, braveness, and equanimity while managing the emotional 
roller coasters of life and overcoming our deeply rooted fears and anxieties. How-
ever, Dewey believes it is possible to surmount these barriers to happiness, and the 
key to doing this, for him, is ethical love. In the following sections, we explain what 
Dewey means by stability of character and braveness and equanimity of soul. We 
also explain why he believes that ethical love opens the door to these dispositions.
Stability of character.  For Dewey, the life of someone who has stable character 
shows consistency and order. People with stable character do not act on their fi rst 
impulses. Th eir lives, as a result, display “ordered richness” rather than episodic 
discontinuity (LW 14: 229). Th e life of a deeply happy person, for Dewey, has a nar-
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rative quality about it, an overriding meaning that gives it depth and development. 
In short, someone with stable character has achieved a dynamic harmony amongst 
her various impulses and thoughts. She has developed a unifi ed, yet growing, more 
and more widely interested self.  
Th e means to achieving this dynamic unity, according to Dewey, is ethical 
love. Stability of character is the result of an individual having a vision of the person 
she wants to become, a person whose life refl ects the ethically loved ideal, in other 
words, the objects esteemed good to which she has chosen to devote herself. Her sta-
bility comes about as she continually shapes her life in accordance with this vision.
Braveness of soul. What does Dewey mean by “braveness of soul?” In remarks 
at his 70th birthday, Dewey observed that one of the greatest obstacles to happiness 
is an all too present underlying fear of life and what it may bring (LW 5: 421). Th is 
generalized fear leads people to turn in on themselves or narrow their interests. It 
keeps them from continually growing and fi nding ways to an expanded self and 
more meaningful, fuller experiences. According to Dewey, the way to overcome this 
fear and develop braveness of soul is by nourishing fear’s opposite, namely, ethical 
love. More specifi cally, he encourages us to love and wholeheartedly embrace what 
we, aft er “using our thought to the utmost,” most value (LW 1: 314). When we do 
this, we so identify with what we value that we devote ourselves to it, a devotion 
that leads to broader interests as we continually explore ways to actualize our ideals. 
More specifi cally, the embrace of esteemed objects enables us to override worries 
about personal pain and death. We “lose” our limited self to “fi nd” an expanded, 
more widely interested one (MW 9: 133; LW 10: 199), an expanded self that is no 
longer focused on protecting a narrow, frightened one.
Dewey’s belief in the power of ethical love to help us overcome fear is dra-
matically expressed in the lines he approvingly quotes from George Eliot’s novel, 
Romola, in both the 1908 and 1932 editions of the Ethics. In the passage that Dewey 
quotes, Eliot’s character refers to the “importance of much feeling for the rest of the 
world” and the ability to sacrifi ce for the ideal that we esteem good as the means to 
the fullest happiness. Eliot’s character declares:
It is only a poor sort of happiness that could ever come by caring very much 
about our own narrow pleasures. We can only have the highest happiness, 
such as goes along with being a great man, by having wide thought and 
much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves; and this sort of 
happiness oft en brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from 
pain by its being what we would choose before everything else, because 
our souls see it is good. (MW 5: 274; LW 7: 199)
In Dewey’s admiration for Eliot’s character’s counsel about how to achieve 
happiness, we hear echoes of Dewey’s Protestant Christianity, echoes of the reli-
gious idea of our narrow selves being “vanquished” to fi nd larger selves (LW 9: 15). 
However, Dewey secularizes the idea of being vanquished by urging us to submit 
to the demands of an esteemed ideal rather than the demands of a deity. 
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Aside from overcoming fears and allowing us to develop larger, more ex-
ploratory and open selves, what other consequences follow from nurturing ethical 
love and embracing an esteemed ideal?  For Dewey, braveness of soul helps us see 
setbacks as inevitable but not to be regretted. It helps us see untoward events as 
new opportunities for experiencing the joys of growth as we consider ways to deal 
with these new challenges (LW 1: 49). As Dewey remarks in his popular 1930 essay, 
“What I Believe,” there is joy even in the midst of trouble and defeat “whenever life-
experiences are treated as potential disclosures of meanings and values that are to 
be used as means to a fuller and more signifi cant future experience” (LW 5: 272).
“Braveness of soul,” for Dewey, also helps us accept that, given the human 
condition, we cannot have everything we want (LW 7: 189). We accept the diffi  cult 
choices we must make between competing goods. A person with braveness of soul 
is willing to give up important desires, as well as the present pleasures that the 
thought of their future satisfaction yields, in order to satisfy other desires that re-
fl ection reveals as more worthy. For example, a person with braveness of soul may 
sacrifi ce the desire to avoid risking her physical well being for the sake of working 
for the common good, for promoting democratic living and making more read-
ily available to others the goods and practices that she fi nds most excellent in life. 
Otherwise put, braveness of soul means having what Dewey calls “strength of will”: 
being able to accept pain and hardship in pursuit of the common good (LW 7: 190).6
Equanimity of soul. Regarding the importance of “equanimity of soul” as a 
component of happiness and a consequence of ethical love, we take Dewey to be-
lieve that a person who has equanimity of soul sees herself as in communion with 
rather than alienated from nature. She sees nature as the source of her own ability 
to love and further what she fi nds excellent in life. Her sense of continuity rather 
than alienation from nature enables her to experience peace in her activities or dur-
ing her pursuit of the ideal that she has embraced and not just in brief moments of 
rest or during brief feelings of accomplishment (MW 14: 181). In short, a person 
with equanimity has respect for the universe “in which we live and have our being” 
(MW 14: 227).  She appreciates both the uncertainties of nature and the ways nature 
cooperates with her, at least at times, in furthering and reconstructing her ideals.  
Refl ecting his own reverence for nature, Dewey off ers the following advice. 
Th e way to fi nding unity with the world is by becoming more sensitive to our sur-
roundings. We need to enlarge the self by opening to nature and trusting its rhythms 
and potential for idealization. Using an image of moonlight refl ected on the water 
that is reminiscent of an image Wordsworth used in “Th e World Is Too Much With 
Us,” Dewey lyrically expresses his own experience of peace as feelings of belonging 
in the world. Th e conclusion of a poem that Dewey most likely composed in his 50s 
or 60s reads as follows:
Th en rose the swelling moon
And gently sought its magic way
Across the waters. In a tune
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Of silver’d silence merged the day
With night, earth with sky, the world and me.
Th rough the moonlight’s soft ly shining grey
By the magic of inaction beguiled
Life and death slept close reconciled (Dewey, 1979, p. 20)
In this poem, Dewey expresses his belief that we are oft en out of tune with 
nature. We are not moved by the ways in which what we see in the universe is 
ours. “Th ere is no limit,” he writes, “to the capacity of immediate sensuous experi-
ence to absorb into itself meanings and values that in and of themselves—that in 
the abstract—would be designated ‘ideal’ and ‘spiritual’” (LW 10: 35-36). In other 
words, if we can get in tune with the universe, then the objects esteemed good that 
can be promoted and the richer, fuller experiences that can be made more avail-
able to others are infi nite. We have a chance to experience a harmony of self and 
world that enables us to keep on keeping on, to continue working to realize our 
ethically loved ideal, despite life’s inevitable defeats and frustrations. It is the sort 
of dynamic harmony and belonging that Dewey expressed in his poem as he gazed 
one night at a moonlit bay.
We interpret Dewey’s counsel to expand the self so that we feel unifi ed with 
the world as a way of asking us to put aside our egos or narrow selves, and ethical 
love helps us do this. It helps us see that our eff ort to work intelligently on behalf 
of the goods we most esteem is not just our own idea or the idea of those in agree-
ment with us. Our eff orts in service of the common good are an expression of 
what is intelligent in nature.  In the passage from Experience and Nature that John 
Herman Randall, Dewey’s student and longtime Columbia University colleague, 
calls “the most eloquent passage in Dewey’s most important book” (1940, p. 125). 
Dewey writes,
Men move between extremes. Th ey conceive of themselves as gods, or feign 
a powerful and cunning god as an ally who bends the world to do their 
bidding and meet their wishes. Disillusioned, they disown the world that 
disappoints them; and hugging ideals to themselves as their own posses-
sion, stand in haughty aloofness apart from the hard course of events that 
pays so little heed to our hopes and aspirations. But a mind that has opened 
itself to experience . . . knows that its juvenile assumption of power and 
achievement is not a dream to be wholly forgotten. It implies a unity with 
the universe that is to be preserved. Th e belief, and the eff ort of thought 
and struggle which it inspires are also the doing of the universe, and they 
in some way, however slight, carry the universe forward. (LW 1: 313-314)
Dewey recognizes that in a post-Darwinian world, one without divine guar-
antees of the triumph of the better over the worse, it is easy to give up or conclude 
that, in pursuing our esteemed object, we are working fruitlessly on our own.  We 
need to avoid despair or the cynicism refl ected in Macbeth’s view that life is a tale 
told by an idiot (LW 10: 197) by being less egotistical and remembering that our 
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energy, hopes, and desires are expressions of the universe that has spawned us. Our 
ideals are not our “own possession.” We should know that they are also “the doing 
of the universe.” According to Dewey, a keen sense that devotion to our ideals is 
part of the doing of the universe yields the equanimity that is an important means 
to steady eff orts on behalf of our ideals despite the obstacles and defeats that con-
stantly shadow our quest.  
With this fuller picture in mind of Dewey’s view of stable character and brave-
ness and equanimity of soul, we can see why he views these as expressions of both 
ethical love and the happiness that accompanies it. Before concluding our essay, we 
briefl y discuss some philosophic roots of Dewey’s views of ethical love and happi-
ness as well as consider—plus off er a possible rejoinder to—a potential criticism of 
his challenge to teachers. 
Philosophic Roots of Dewey’s Views of Ethical Love and the 
Highest Happiness 
Although numerous philosophic strands are woven in Dewey’s thinking, with re-
gard to his challenge to teachers, we briefl y discuss two: the Classical Greek tradi-
tion and nineteenth-century Romanticism.
Dewey’s Views of Ethical Love and Happiness as Rooted in the Classical 
Greek Tradition 
In arguing that intelligent and passionate devotion to furthering the general good 
(ethical love) is the means to the highest human happiness, Dewey is very much 
in the classical Greek tradition.  For example, Socrates devotedly pursues his ideal 
of a democratic polis by living his life in accordance with his vision of responsible 
Athenian citizenship. In this respect, Socrates exemplifi es a life shaped by ethical 
love. He also exemplifi es the sort of happiness—the stability, courage, and equa-
nimity—that Dewey claims will issue from ethical love. Despite what many might 
consider an unhappy life-ending, Socrates is calm and brave in the face of death 
because he believes that he has become the person he wants to be as the “gadfl y” 
of Athens. Although out of step with many Athenian citizens, he believes he is in 
step with the proper ordering of the human soul and the true order of the universe 
(Plato, 1948, pp. 48-49). In sum, Socrates’ life is a case study of the fruits of ethical 
love and the ways in which it can promote social reform as well as individual ful-
fi llment and happiness.
Like Dewey and Socrates, Aristotle also identifi es ethical love—what he calls 
the exercise of the intellectual and practical virtues—with the highest happiness 
(1962, pp. 287-291).  He also notes that most people (“the common run”) believe 
that happiness comes from pleasure, wealth, or honor (1962, p.6), and, like Dewey, 
he rejects pleasure, wealth, and honor as means to happiness. Also anticipating 
Dewey, one of the reasons Aristotle rejects these as means to happiness is because he 
believes that we are not in control of them. Th eir fruits can easily be taken from us. 
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Dewey’s Views of Ethical Love and Happiness as Rooted in Nineteenth-
Century Romanticism 
Dewey’s challenge to teachers refl ects not only the infl uence of classical Greek 
views but also the infl uence of another important philosophic tradition, namely, 
nineteenth-century philosophic Romanticism. What Dewey inherits from this 
tradition is the view of the world as imperfect but growing, a dynamic organism 
capable of idealization and perfection. He also inherits the belief that reason is in-
adequate to reveal the nature of the world. One needs imagination and intuition as 
well. Dewey’s debt to this tradition is most pronounced in his charge to teachers to 
cultivate students’ natural sympathies for other people, all living things, and nature. 
Many Dewey scholars have explicated the infl uence of Hegel’s nineteenth-
century idealism on Dewey (see, e.g., Good, 2006). What is less explored is another 
nineteenth-century infl uence on Dewey, namely, the romanticism of John Stuart 
Mill. Dewey wrote extensively about Mill, and in Mill’s life and work Dewey may 
very well have seen a foreshadowing of himself, someone who found that a fulfi ll-
ing and moral life requires the development of both thought and feeling. In ways 
that parallel Dewey’s own intellectual and spiritual history, Mill, when 22, found 
in Wordsworth’s poetry a way of cultivating his own “internal susceptibilities,” a 
cultivation that he came to realize was a crucial accompaniment to cultivation of 
the intellect (Mill, 1969/1873, pp. 88-91).  
Mill foreshadows Dewey not only in valuing emotions alongside rational-
ity but also in prefi guring Dewey’s notion of the “paradox” of happiness (Mill, 
2001/1863, p.16; Dewey, LW 7: 246).  In 1863, Mill writes, “paradoxical as it may 
be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best chance of realizing 
such happiness as is attainable” (2001/1863, p. 16).  In the 1932 Ethics, Dewey echoes 
Mill about the “paradox” of happiness. He observes that the most enduring hap-
piness is secured when one does not make it an end-in-view and stops going aft er 
it directly (LW 7: 246).  Th is is consistent with Dewey’s view of the role of ethical 
love in happiness. If we constantly focus on whether or not we are happy, we will 
hardly be able to fully embrace and devote ourselves to objects we esteem good. 
We will miss the joy and sense of fulfi llment that such devotion yields. In other 
words, Dewey’s view of ethical love’s role in happiness implicitly counsels that the 
best way to achieve happiness is to forget about one’s own well-being and work to 
improve the conditions of others.  He wants us to develop the habit of promoting 
and making more widely available what we fi nd excellent in life so that the thought 
of doing so gives us pleasure and continues to motivate us into action (LW 9: 35). 
In 1863, a generation before Dewey, Mill made the same point: 
[W]hen people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not fi nd 
in life suffi  cient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally 
is caring for nobody but themselves. To those who have neither public nor 
private aff ections, the excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case 
dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfi sh interest must be 
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terminated by death; while those who leave aft er them objects of personal 
aff ection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling 
with the collective interests of mankind retain as lively an interest in life on 
the eve of death as in the vigor of youth and health. (2001/1863, pp. 13-14) 
Mill’s stress, in the above quotation, on the importance of cultivating “a fellow 
feeling with the collective interests of mankind” anticipates the belief at the center of 
Dewey’s conception of ethical love. In addition, Mill’s focus on the importance of ex-
panding our interests is very much an anticipation of Dewey’s emphasis on expand-
ing the self (and our interests) through creative devotion to objects esteemed good. 
A Potential Criticism of Dewey’s Challenge to Teachers: It is 
Based Upon a Flawed Conception of Human Nature 
Th ose who would reject Dewey’s challenge to teachers to help their students de-
velop ethical love might claim that it is based on a fl awed understanding of human 
nature, a too optimistic view of our capacity for sympathy for others to overcome 
narrow self-centeredness. One such critic is Reinhold Niebuhr. Writing in 1932, the 
same year that Dewey presented his challenge to teachers, Niebhur criticizes Dewey 
and his followers for wanting to “save society by increasing the social and political 
intelligence of the general community through the agency of the school” (1932, p. 
212). As opposed to Dewey, Niebuhr argues that change of social institutions re-
quires force. Niebhur writes, “Since reason is always, to some degree, the servant 
of interest in a social situation, social injustice cannot be resolved by moral and ra-
tional suasion alone, as the educator and social scientist usually believes. Confl ict 
is inevitable, and in this confl ict power must be challenged by power.  Th at fact is 
not recognized by most of the educators . . . ” (pp. xiv-xv).    
Th ose, who, like Neibuhr, charge Dewey with an overly optimistic view of 
our capacity for devotion to objects esteemed good might add to their argument by 
citing Jeremy Bentham’s analysis of human motivation. Bentham claims that the 
only motive we have for being considerate and helpful to others is believing that 
there is a strong chance of profi ting by being so (1879, pp. 312-313). 
How Dewey Might Answer This Criticism
Although Dewey is oft en said to lack a sense of the tragic in life and an understand-
ing of humans’ capacity for cruelty and insensitivity to others (McDermott, 1991, 
xxxii; Rockefeller, 1993, pp. 486-487; West, 1993, p. 108), he does recognize that all 
of us have the potential to be narrowly self-centered and self-serving. As an exam-
ple, in 1934 he clearly acknowledges the “staggering” corruption in politics and the 
widespread “brutality” and “oppression” in commerce (LW 9: 49).  Nevertheless, he 
believes that, as social creatures, we also have a deep need for harmony with oth-
ers and nature, a need that, at best, our current social institutions do not develop 
and, at worst, substantially frustrate or let atrophy.8 Dewey also believes that this 
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need for dynamic harmony with others and nature is the foundation of our desire 
to lead meaningful, expanding lives and to devote ourselves to ideals shared with 
others, including those from earlier and later generations.
In addition to pointing to our needs and capacities as social creatures, Dewey 
might respond by stressing that he does not hold, as critics like Niebuhr assume, 
that intelligent, responsible behavior is the result of simply appealing to reason or 
cultivating our ability to calculate and foresee consequences. As we have pointed 
out, Dewey argues forcefully that all the reasoning in the world will be fruitless as 
a force for social reform if it does not “stir” our emotions (MW 5: 231). Without 
such emotional commitment, reasons will, at best, result in half-hearted rather than 
wholehearted pursuit of esteemed ideals. Th is is why he insists that intelligent, re-
sponsible behavior is also dependent on an integrated approach to the development 
of character, on the cultivation of foresight and analysis as well as our “impulses 
toward aff ection, compassion and justice, equality and freedom” (LW 9: 54). Along-
side cognitive development, such aff ection is crucial, for Dewey, if our culture is to 
foster highly skilled professionals who exhibit ethical love and a devotion to goods 
that can be widely and equitably shared.  
Conclusion 
Th e challenge with which Dewey confronts educators is a daunting one. Dewey 
wants teachers to cultivate students’ capacities for ethical love, that is, for devoting 
themselves to esteemed objects that they choose wisely and passionately. He argues 
that, as paradoxical as it sounds, this is not only the best way to bring about social 
reform but also the best way to increase students’ chances of gaining the fullest hap-
piness. Unfortunately, in a culture that rewards competitiveness over cooperation 
and is increasingly colored by a global economy that is (to borrow Dewey’s terms) 
“brutal,” “oppressive,” and “egoistic,” nurturing the desire among students to pro-
mote the common welfare is far from easy. It not only is out of step with widely held 
cultural values, it is also out of step with a school culture that stresses high-stakes 
testing, work-place preparation, and a climate of “learn to earn” (Whipps, 2008, p. 
59). Nevertheless, we have explicated the thinking underlying Dewey’s challenge 
to teachers, his conceptions of ethical love, social reform, and happiness, in order 
to justify our claim that his challenge is worthy of educators’ reconsideration. 
In sum, in an era that pollsters say is characterized by cynicism, despair, and 
the deepest expression of pessimism in U.S. polling history, Dewey’s challenge gives 
educators hope that there is something they can do in their classrooms, schools, 
and universities to alter this climate.  Th at is, Dewey off ers an answer to the most 
important question facing educators today: How can we help our students both 
earn a living and shape a life worth living?9
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Notes
1. Th ose who believe that the development of cognitive skills is most important to 
moral conduct oft en argue that emotions get in the way of clear thinking. Emotions can, 
as William James pointed out, push aside all inclinations to careful refl ection that might 
block the discharge of fi rst impulses. “When any strong emotional state whatever is upon 
us the tendency is for no images but such as are congruous with it to come up” (1950/1890 
p. 563). On the other hand, those who believe that our moral emotions are most important 
in ethical conduct argue that moral thinking is simply a rationalization for actions driven 
and controlled by emotion.  (For an interpretation of moral conduct as primarily cognitive, 
see Kohlberg, 1969.  For an interpretation of moral conduct as primarily emotive, see Ayer, 
1946/1936, ch. 6; Haidt, 2001.) 
2.  Th e percentage of sessions focused on character education at the 2009 AERA Con-
vention was confi rmed in an email to the authors on April 24, 2009 by Angelle Stromeyer, 
AERA Program Assistant. 
3.  A little over one decade ago, Jim Garrison focused on this same important and oft en 
overlooked aspect of Dewey’s approach to teaching.  Garrison lamented the lack of educa-
tional researchers’ attention to the need to train students’ feelings and emotions.  He wrote, 
“Because we become what we love, because that is how people grow, educating eros to desire 
the greatest good with the greatest passion should be that aspect of education that receives 
the greatest attention.  Ironically, the offi  cial curriculum, as well as most research on teach-
ing ignores the passions altogether” (1997, p. 29).
4.  Without meaning to imply that Dewey was a Marxist, since he was highly critical 
of Marx, we note that in this quote from Dewey’s A Common Faith, the adjectives Dewey 
chooses to characterize his own times echo language used by Marx and Engels in “Th e Com-
munist Manifesto” to characterize industrial society in the mid-nineteenth century. Describ-
ing the distinguishing marks of modern capitalism, Marx and Engels write that, for veiled 
exploitation, “it [capitalism] has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation” 
(1978/1848, p. 475).  Given Dewey’s high praise for Edward Bellamy’s late nineteenth-century 
novel, Looking Backward (LW 9: 106), if we were to risk the dangers of labeling his politi-
cal position, we would call Dewey a “socialist democrat” (for discussion of the diffi  culty of 
labeling Dewey’s politics, see Westbrook, 1991, pp. 429-430).
5.  By using the word “soul” in this context, Dewey is aware that he risks confusing his 
readers because of traditional theories that view the soul as “inhabiting the body in an exter-
nal way” (LW 1: 24). In contrast to these traditional meanings, Dewey uses the word “soul” 
to point to properties that characterize human beings rather than to some mysterious non-
natural entity or force.  He writes, “‘soul’ when freed from all traces of traditional materialistic 
animism denotes the qualities of psycho-physical activities as far as these are organized into 
unity” (LW 1: 223).   In other words, people who have braveness and equanimity of soul dis-
play braveness and equanimity in all that they do. Th eir bravery or courage, their equanimity 
or temperance unify or color all that they do. Th ese character traits, for Dewey, are also united 
or integrated; they inform one another. Th e unity of braveness and equanimity keeps bravery 
from becoming rashness and temperance from becoming passivity or over-accommodation. 
Dewey's Challenge to Teachers     17
Volume 26 (2)  2010
6.  Dewey’s emphasis on the importance of love and devotion to an esteemed object for 
overcoming fear and developing bravery has parallels in Viktor Frankl’s view of the power 
of fi nding meaning in life (1962). We have in mind Frankl’s idea that people who have found 
meaning or a strong goal in life will be brave and keep on pursuing their goal despite per-
sonal suff ering and signifi cant obstacles. One diff erence may be Dewey’s emphasis on the 
moral dimension of one’s objects of devotion, i.e., the importance of one’s goals needing to 
be chosen intelligently and wisely. We also note that the insightfulness of Dewey’s blend 
of cognitive and emotional strategies for overcoming fear becomes more apparent when 
compared to the ideas of contemporary “positive psychologists” like Martin Seligman and 
Jonathan Haidt. Th ey both believe that our pessimism comes from a fear or “negativity bias” 
that serves the evolutionary function of alerting us to possible dangers, but this “bias,” they 
both claim, can lead to terrible unhappiness and, in its more extreme forms, is no longer 
appropriate in today’s environment.  However, Seligman’s and Haidt’s strategy for overcom-
ing pessimism and fear is primarily cognitive. Th ey suggest that when we have a habit of 
forecasting bad consequences, we need to stop and look at the odds of disaster actually oc-
curring or continuing indefi nitely (Seligman, 2002, pp. 93-100 and Jonathan Haidt, 2006, 
pp. 37-39). Although Dewey, as we have pointed out, off ers some cognitive strategies for 
overcoming fear and despair, like viewing untoward events as opportunities for growth, his 
emphasis on the emotional component of human motivation and activity is especially pow-
erful. We say this because love is the opposite emotion of fear and, thus, to appeal to love to 
overcome fear makes great sense.
7.  For an informative study of philosophic, theologic, and aesthetic romanticism, see 
Peckham (1970).
8.  Dewey’s sensitivity to what he viewed as our deep need for harmony with others is 
loud and clear and repeated word-for-word in two of his early works on education. In 1897 
and, again, in 1909 he wrote, “the child is born with a desire to give out, to do, and this means 
to serve” (EW 5: 64; MW 4: 275).  
9.  W. E. B. DuBois, in a talk he gave at Hampton Institute, uses similar language to 
challenge the Institute’s teachers in ways that very much anticipate Dewey’s 1932 challenge 
to teachers. In the summer of 1906, DuBois addressed the faculty at Hampton as follows: 
“I sincerely hope that you will ever be alert to select from your students those of talent and 
promise and impress them with the fact that life is more than living—that necessary as it is to 
earn a living, it is more necessary and important to earn a life: that is to do for the world—its 
thought, its aspiration, its human value—so much that the world will not always continue to 
ask if life is worth living” (1973, p.14).  Dewey also uses similar language in the penultimate 
paragraph of Reconstruction in Philosophy. He writes, “when the liberating force of human 
capacity operates as a socially creative force, art will not be a luxury, a stranger to the daily 
occupations of making a living.  Making a living economically speaking, will be at one with 
making a life that is worth living.  And when the emotional force, the mystic force one might 
say of communication, of the miracle of shared life and shared experience is spontaneously 
felt, the hardness and crudeness of contemporary life will be bathed in the light that never 
was on land or sea” (MW 12: 201).  
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